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This study aimed to confirm the factor structure of the Beliefs about Paranoia Scale (BaPS), 
a self-report measure to assess metacognitive beliefs about paranoia, and to test 
hypotheses of a metacognitive model. We hypothesised that positive and negative beliefs 
about paranoia would be associated with severity of suspiciousness, and that the co-
occurrence of positive and negative beliefs would be associated with increased 
suspiciousness. A total of 335 patients meeting criteria for a schizophrenia spectrum 
disorder completed the BaPS, the Positive and Negative Syndromes Scale (PANSS), and 
the Psychotic Symptom Rating Scales (PSYRATS). Confirmatory factor analysis verified that 
the three BaPS subscales (negative beliefs about paranoia, paranoia as a survival strategy, 
and normalizing beliefs) were an adequate fit of the data. Ordinal regression showed that 
positive beliefs about paranoia as a survival strategy and negative beliefs were both 
associated with severity of suspiciousness. This was the first study to show that the co-
occurrence of positive and negative beliefs was associated with increased suspiciousness. 
All hypotheses were confirmed, suggesting that a metacognitive approach has utility for the 
conceptualization of paranoia. Clinical implications suggest a role for metacognitive therapy, 
including strategies such as detached mindfulness and worry postponement. 
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1. Introduction 
Paranoia has been defined as ‘a disordered mode of thought that is dominated by an 
intense, irrational, but persistent mistrust or suspicion of people and a corresponding 
tendency to interpret the actions of others as deliberately threatening or demeaning’ 
(Fenigstein, 1984). Freeman and Garety (2000) have since defined paranoid ideation as the 
belief that harm is occurring or is going to occur, and that the persecutor has the intention to 
cause harm to the person. It is a frequent symptom of psychosis but paranoid thinking is also 
common in the general population (Freeman et al., 2011), which raises questions concerning 
the factors which contribute to more severe or clinical paranoia (Freeman et al., 2005). 
In order to distinguish between the content of paranoid ideation, and the 
metacognitive processes that drive paranoid thinking, paranoia has also been 
conceptualized as a response to an initial perception of interpersonal threat (Morrison et al., 
2005). The self-regulatory executive function (S-REF) model of psychological dysfunction 
(Wells and Matthews, 1994) provides a useful framework for understanding paranoia as a 
motivated response for managing perceived threat, and the transition to perseverative and 
clinically distressing paranoia. According to the S-REF model, psychological distress is 
maintained by a pattern of responses called the ‘cognitive attentional syndrome’ (CAS) 
consisting of worry or rumination, fixation of attention on threat, and unhelpful coping 
behaviours. The CAS is controlled by metacognitive beliefs, including positive beliefs about 
the need to engage in aspects of the CAS which drive more frequent use of those responses 
(e.g. ‘worry means I’ll be prepared’), and negative beliefs about the uncontrollability, 
dangerousness or importance of thoughts of feelings (e.g. ‘my anxiety could make me go 
crazy’) which result in distress and disability (Wells, 2009). Metacognitive theory predicts that 
the co-occurrence of positive and negative beliefs is especially problematic, resulting in a 
state of meta-cognitive dissonance, conflicts in self-regulation and the maintenance of 
distress (Wells, 2009). For example, in the metacognitive model of generalized anxiety 
disorder (GAD), positive beliefs about worry are considered normal but contribute to 
repeated worry episodes of longer duration, which can lead a high level of automization, the 
experience of disruptive worry, and the development negative beliefs about worry as being 
dangerous or uncontrollable (Wells, 1995). It has been stated that ‘because the person with 
GAD has negative beliefs about worrying and also feels that it is necessary to worry  
in response  to  negative  thought  triggers,  a  self-regulatory conflict exists’ (Wells and 
Carter, 2001). Negative metabeliefs are linked to distress and catastrophisation about worry, 
counterproductive attempts to suppress worry, and have been shown to define pathological 
worry in GAD (Wells and Carter, 2001). 
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Applying these principles to a metacognitive model of paranoia, Morrison et al. 
(2011) outlined how paranoid thoughts could be engaged with or not, in a similar way to the 
model of worry in GAD (Wells, 1995). A trigger situation or event (e.g. going out and seeing 
a young male, or having an intrusive image of violence) could activate positive beliefs about 
paranoia as a method of coping with the perceived threat (e.g., ‘It is important to be alert for 
danger in order to survive’). This could then lead to specific paranoid thoughts (e.g., ‘That 
man is going to attack me’), and in turn, the activation of negative beliefs (e.g., ‘My paranoia 
is uncontrollable’) and catastrophization (e.g., ‘I’m going mad and will end up in hospital 
again’), leading to emotional distress and attempts to control or avoid paranoia which may 
maintain the problem (e.g. avoidance behaviour, thought suppression and substance use). 
Simultaneously holding positive and negative beliefs is thought to predict more severe 
paranoia, as people vacillate between motives to engage with paranoia versus attempts to 
suppress it, and experience a sense of loss of control over cognition and emotion and 
sustained distress as a consequence. 
There is increasing evidence for the role of metacognition in paranoia. Freeman and 
Garety (1999) found that meta-worry about the uncontrollability of delusion relevant thoughts 
was highly correlated with delusional distress. This suggests that the distress caused by a 
persecutory delusion is not simply due to the content of paranoid thoughts per se (Freeman 
and Garety, 1999)  but also depends on how people relate and respond to their psychotic 
experiences (Chadwick, 2014). In non-clinical samples, positive beliefs about worry and 
negative beliefs about the uncontrollability of thoughts were associated with paranoid 
ideation (Laroi and Van der Linden, 2005; Varese et al., 2011). Furthermore, positive and 
negative metacognitions were found to be elevated among people with persecutory 
delusions (Morrison and Wells, 2003). However, these studies used general measures of 
metacognitive beliefs about worry and thoughts, such as the Metacognitions Questionnaire 
(Cartwright-Hatton and Wells, 1997) rather than a measure specific to paranoid ideation.  
Morrison et al. (2005) developed the Beliefs about Paranoia Scale (BaPS) to assess 
metacognitive beliefs about paranoia. The measure revealed four subscales (negative 
beliefs about paranoia, positive beliefs about paranoia as a survival strategy, general 
positive beliefs about paranoia, and normalizing beliefs e.g. ‘paranoia is just human nature’) 
in a non-clinical sample (Morrison et al., 2005). Consistent with the metacognitive model, 
positive beliefs about paranoia as a survival strategy were associated with more frequent 
paranoid thoughts and negative beliefs were associated with distress due to delusional 
ideation. Gumley et al. (2011) subsequently developed a brief 18-item version of the BaPS 
using a non-clinical sample, which had a three-factor structure (negative beliefs about 
paranoia, paranoia as a survival strategy, and normalizing beliefs), and both negative beliefs 
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and survival beliefs were predictive of paranoia frequency and distress. Gumley et al., (2011) 
rejected the fourth factor of general positive beliefs (e.g. ‘paranoia can make life seem more 
exciting and exhilarating’) due to inadequate fit of the four-factor model. The three-factor 
structure and good internal consistency of the 18-item BaPS has since been replicated in a 
sample of 122 patients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia spectrum disorder (Morrison et al., 
2011). Survival beliefs were found to be associated with severity of suspiciousness, and 
negative beliefs were higher among those meeting diagnostic criteria for persecutory 
delusions. A comparison with a non-clinical control group also found that patients with 
psychosis scored higher than non-patients on both survival and negative beliefs (Morrison et 
al., 2011). However, this study did not find that the co-occurrence of positive and negative 
beliefs about paranoia interacted to predict patient status. There were some limitations in 
that PANSS outcome scores and diagnostic data on persecutory delusions were only 
available for a subsample of 60 patients. Therefore, the use of a binary outcome of more 
generic patient status may have resulted in a lack of power to detect the interaction effect, 
compared to the use of PANSS scores as an outcome. In summary, these studies provide 
increasing evidence for good psychometric properties of the BaPS and some support for a 
metacognitive model of paranoia. However, there is scope to examine the BaPS and the 
specific hypotheses of the metacognitive model in a larger clinical sample with more 
complete outcome data using the PANSS.  
The present study aimed to confirm the three-factor structure of the BaPS in a large 
clinical sample, and to test hypotheses based on a metacognitive conceptualisation of 
paranoia. It was expected that the three subscales of the BaPS would be verified in the 
clinical sample. Based on a metacognitive model, it was hypothesised that i) negative beliefs 
about paranoia would be associated with distress due to delusional ideation; ii) both positive 
and negative beliefs about paranoia would be associated with increased suspiciousness 
ratings on the PANSS; and iii) their co-occurrence would be associated with higher severity 
of suspiciousness ratings on the PANSS. 
 
 
2. Methods 
2.1 Participants 
All participants were involved in research trials of cognitive therapy that incorporated the 
study measures during the baseline assessments. Two of the studies have been published 
(Morrison et al., 2014a; Morrison et al., 2014b) and the other trial was ongoing at the time of 
writing (FOCUS trial; ISRCT number 99672552). All participants met International 
Classification of Diseases–tenth revision (ICD-10) criteria for schizophrenia, schizoaffective 
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disorder, or delusional disorder, or met entry criteria for an early intervention for psychosis 
service (operationally defined with the PANSS as a score of 4 or more on delusions or 
hallucinations) to allow for diagnostic uncertainty in early phases of psychosis. 
 
2.2 Measures 
The Beliefs about Paranoia Scale (BaPS) is a self-report questionnaire developed to 
measure metacognitive processes involved in paranoia by measuring positive and negative 
beliefs about paranoia. The BaPS consists of a number of attitudes and thoughts that people 
have expressed about paranoia based on clinical knowledge of patients experiencing 
persecutory delusions (Morrison et al., 2005). Each item is scored on a 4-point scale to 
measure conviction (1 = not at all, 2 = somewhat, 3 = moderately so, 4 = very much). The 
revised 18 item short-form version of the measure was developed in a non-clinical sample 
and was found to measure three factors of negative beliefs about paranoia, positive beliefs 
about paranoia as a survival strategy (hereafter referred to as survival beliefs), and 
normalizing beliefs (Gumley et al., 2011). These factors were replicated in a clinical sample 
(Morrison et al., 2011). The internal consistency of the measure (Cronbach’s alpha) in the 
current sample was 0.88 for the total scale, and was 0.87, 0.88 and 0.89 for the survival, 
negative and normalizing subscales respectively.  
 
The Positive and Negative Syndrome scale (PANSS Kay et al., 1987) is a clinician-
administered, 30-item semi-structured interview assessing positive symptomatology, 
negative symptomatology and general psychopathology. Previous studies have shown the 
reliability and validity of the measure (Kay et al., 1987). Inter-rater reliability was assessed in 
the current sample for those participating in trials with more than one rater. Intra-class 
correlation coefficients indicated good reliability between raters (mean 0·83, SD 0·12 
(Morrison et al., 2014b) and mean 0.8, SD 0.07 for the ongoing FOCUS trial), and 
Cronbach’s alpha within the current sample was 0.78. We used ratings on the PANSS 
‘suspiciousness/ persecution’ item as the main outcome to assess clinical paranoia (defined 
on the PANSS as ‘unrealistic or exaggerated ideas of persecution, as reflected in 
guardedness, a distrustful attitude, suspicious hypervigilance or frank delusions that others 
mean harm’) and which we refer to as ‘severity of suspiciousness’ in the current study. We 
also included three other items from the PANSS thought to be associated with the 
experience of paranoia. The additional items were the ‘delusions’ item (defined as ‘beliefs 
which are unfounded, unrealistic and idiosyncratic’) and two items from the general 
psychopathology subscale: ‘anxiety’ (‘subjective experience of nervousness, worry, 
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apprehension or restlessness, ranging from excessive concern about the present or future to 
feelings of panic’) and ‘active social avoidance’ (diminished social involvement associated 
with unwarranted fear, hostility, or distrust’). All items are rated by the interviewer and scored 
between 1 (not present) and 7 (severe).  
 
The Psychotic Symptom Rating Scales (PSYRATS, Haddock et al., 1999) is a clinician-
administered 17-item semi-structured interview assessing dimensions of auditory 
hallucinations and delusional beliefs. The reliability and validity of the measure has been 
previously examined, and the inter-rater reliability of each dimension of the measure (intra-
class correlation) has been shown to range from 0.79 to 1.00, Haddock et al., 1999). 
Cronbach’s alpha within the current sample was 0.90. In the current study, the six items of 
the delusions scale were examined which included i) the amount of preoccupation with 
beliefs (time spent thinking about the beliefs), ii) duration of preoccupation with beliefs (how 
long the belief persists when it comes into their mind), iii) conviction in the beliefs (how 
convinced they are that the beliefs are true), iv) amount of distress (whether the beliefs 
cause distress and for how much of the time), v) intensity of distress (how severe the 
distress feels) and vi) disruption (whether the belief interferes with activities, self-care or 
relationships). All items are scored from 0 to 4, with higher scores showing more severe 
phenomena.  
 
2.3 Data analysis 
AMOS version 22 (Arbuckle, 2013) was used to perform confirmatory factor analysis to test 
the goodness of fit of the BaPS to a three factor solution. The remaining analyses were 
performed using SPSS version 19.0 (IBM, Released 2010). Exploratory correlational 
analysis (Pearson’s r) was initially used to present the overall associations between the 
BaPS subscales with the PANSS items and the PSYRATS delusions subscale. As a priori 
hypotheses were not specified for every association between the BaPS with the PANSS (4-
items) and PSYRATS (6-items), the significance value for the correlation analysis was 
adjusted for multiple comparisons. In order to test the first hypothesis that negative beliefs 
about paranoia would be associated with distress due to delusional ideation, the specific 
correlation between BaPS negative beliefs about paranoia and PSYRATS amount and 
intensity of distress due to delusional ideation was examined. Descriptive data on 
mean BaPS subscale scores was presented for those with a lower score of 1 to 4 on the 
suspiciousness/ persecution item on the PANSS versus a higher score of 5 (‘Moderate 
Severe’) or above and significance values were generated via t-test. This cut-off point was 
chosen as consistent with one of the criteria for defining the presence of psychosis for entry 
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into clinical trials (whereby all participants must score at least 4 on PANSS delusions or 
hallucinations, or at least 5 on suspiciousness or persecution, conceptual disorganisation, or 
grandiosity).  
 
Ordinal logistic regression was used to test the specific hypotheses that BaPS positive 
beliefs about paranoia would be associated with PANSS suspiciousness, that BaPS 
negative beliefs about paranoia would be associated with PANSS suspiciousness, and 
finally that the co-occurrence of positive and negative beliefs would be associated with 
higher severity of suspiciousness. To test the interaction hypothesis, the regression model 
included the subscale scores for negative beliefs, positive beliefs and the product term of 
these two variables. The subscale scores were standardized (z-scores) prior to creation of 
the product term (Miles and Shevlin, 2001). We used ordinal regression because the PANSS 
suspiciousness/ persecution item was a single item rated according to ordinal categories 
(‘not present’ to ‘severe’). The assumption of proportional odds was met for the ordinal 
regression models (showing that the effect of the explanatory variables was consistent 
across each level of the ordinal outcome variable). 
  
 
3. Results 
 
3.1 Sample 
The number of participants completing the study measures was 335. The mean age of the 
group was 40.6 years (SD = 11.7; range 17–73 years), 66.8% of participants were male and 
91.5% were of White ethnicity, with the remainder being from Black (5.2%), Asian (2.7%) 
and other ethnic groups (0.6%). The BaPS data were normally distributed (Kolmogorov-
Smirnov statistic 0.04, p = 0.2). The mean total PANSS score of the sample was 79.2 (SD 
13.7), which equates to a ‘moderately’ ill population on average (Leucht et al., 2005). 
 
3.2 Confirmatory factor analysis  
The three component solution was modelled with data from all 335 participants. All 
standardised regression weights were found to be acceptable, as they were above the cut-
off of 0.5 (range: 0.60 - 0.88, Hair, Black et al., 2014);  except for one item on the negative 
beliefs scale which had a regression weight of 0.47 (‘my paranoia gets exaggerated’). The 
correlations between the each of the three factors were found to be in moderate range and 
were as follows: survival (positive) beliefs and negative beliefs = 0.33, survival beliefs and 
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normalising beliefs = 0.47, and negative beliefs and normalising beliefs = 0.31). A well-fitting 
model is indicated by a non-significant chi-square result. In this case, the chi-square found 
was significant (X2 (132) = 358.59, p < 0.001). However, the chi-square result is extremely 
sensitive (Hu and Bentler, 1995) and can be problematic in large samples (Hoe, 2008) and 
so the adjusted chi-square (CMIN/DF1) was examined for a more reliable indication of fit.  
The CMIN/DF is considered acceptable if it is lower than 3 (Hoe, 2008) and was found here 
to be 2.72. The RMSEA2 indicates good fit if it is below 0.08 (Hoe 2008) and ideally below 
0.06 (Hu and Bentler, 1999). The RMSEA found here was 0.07, and so indicated moderate 
fit. The GFI3 was 0.89 and so was just below the suggested cut off of above 0.9. The SRMR4 
was 0.07, and so was below the accepted cut-off of < 0.08 (Hu and Bentler, 1999). The CFI5 
met the recommended cut-off of above 0.90 (0.93), as did the TLI6 (0.92, Hoe, 2008). 
Therefore, the minimum requirement was met for most indices and the model was 
considered an adequate fit.  
Modification indices suggested allowing several of the error terms to correlate within each 
subscale. These made theoretical sense given that pairs of questionnaire items often share 
variance apart from the variance accounted for by the factors, due to item content overlap 
(Floyd and Widaman, 1995).  Allowing correlation of the error terms improved model fit as 
follows: x2 (123) = 205.05, p < 0.001; CMIN/DF = 1.67, RMSEA = 0.05, GFI = 0.94, SRMR = 
0.07, CFI = 0.98, TLI = 0.97.  Except for the chi-square, which remained significant, all other 
indices and the adjusted chi-square indicated that the model was a good fit. Figure 1 
summarises the modified model and shows the standardized regression weights for each of 
the BaPS items onto its corresponding subscale. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 CMIN/DF = Chi-square / Degrees of freedom ratio 
2 RMSEA = Root mean square error of approximation 
3 GFI = Goodness of fit SRMR = Standardised root mean square residual index 
4 SRMR = Standardised root mean square residual 
5 CFI = Comparative fit index 
6 TLI = Tucker-Lewis Index 
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3.3 Associations between the BaPS,  PANSS and PSYRATS  
Table 1 shows correlations between the BaPS subscales, PSYRATS delusions subscale 
and items from the PANSS (measuring delusions, suspiciousness/ persecution, anxiety and 
active social avoidance). As hypothesised according to a metacognitive model, BaPS 
negative beliefs were significantly associated with PSYRATS amount and intensity of 
distress due to delusional ideation (r = 0.38, p < 0.001 and r = 0.33, p < 0.001 respectively). 
The BaPS negative beliefs subscale was also significantly correlated with the anxiety and 
social avoidance items of the PANSS. Both the BaPS negative beliefs and BaPS survival 
beliefs subscale were correlated with suspiciousness ratings on the PANSS as expected. 
Normalizing beliefs were not correlated with any of the PANSS or PSYRATS items.  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Table 2 shows the mean BaPS subscale scores among individuals classified as having 
moderate to severe scores on the PANSS suspiciousness/ persecution item (5 or above) 
versus lower scores. Significant differences were observed for the BaPS total score as well 
as the survival and negative beliefs subscales. 
 
[Insert table 2 about here] 
  
 
 
3.4 Ordinal regression analyses 
3.4.1 BaPS survival beliefs and negative beliefs as predictors of PANSS suspiciousness 
As hypothesised, the BaPS negative and survival beliefs both predicted PANSS 
suspiciousness ratings. The subscales predicted PANSS suspiciousness independently of 
one another when entered together with normalizing beliefs into a multivariate ordinal logistic 
regression model (Table 3). The BaPS negative and survival subscales remained significant 
predictors after adding PANSS anxiety and depression scores to the model: the odds ratios 
or survival and negative beliefs were 1.06, 95%CI (1.01, 1.12), p = 0.001 and 1.08, 95%CI 
(1.03, 1.13), p = 0.012 respectively.  
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
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3.4.2 Co-occurring BaPS survival and negative beliefs as predictors of PANSS 
suspiciousness  
As hypothesized, the co-occurrence of BaPS negative and survival beliefs was associated 
with greater severity of PANSS suspiciousness as shown by the significant interaction term 
(Table 4). The entry of the interaction term removed the independent effect of survival beliefs 
as a predictor of PANSS suspiciousness, though the negative subscale remained significant. 
The interaction term also remained significant after controlling for PANSS anxiety and 
depression (OR 1.27, 95%CI (1.03, 1.56), p = 0.024). 
 
 
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 details the nature of the interaction. The regression lines show that BaPS survival 
beliefs were only associated with PANSS suspiciousness for those participants with 
moderate to high ratings on BaPS negative beliefs. Regarding the relative effects, the 
correlation coefficients between BaPS survival beliefs and PANSS suspiciousness for the 
different levels of BaPS negative beliefs (split by tertiles) were r = -0.02 (p = 0.836) for low 
negative beliefs, r = 0.146 (p = 0.136) for moderate negative beliefs and r = 0.308 (p = 
0.001) for high negative beliefs. Considering the relationship between BaPS negative beliefs 
and PANSS suspiciousness at different levels of BaPS survival beliefs (split into tertiles) 
reveals r = 0.195 (p = 0.03), r = 0.317 (p < 0.001) and r = 0.429 (p < 0.001) for low, medium 
and high levels of survival respectively. In the whole sample, the correlation between BaPS 
survival beliefs and PANSS suspiciousness was 0.220 (p < 0.001) and the correlation 
between BaPS negative beliefs and PANSS suspiciousness was 0.319 (p < 0.001).  
 
 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
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4. Discussion 
4.1 Main findings 
The three BaPS subscales of survival, negative and normalizing beliefs were confirmed in a 
large clinical sample. The three subscales were at least an adequate fit of the data, and the 
modified model showed a good fit of the data. As hypothesised by a metacognitive 
conceptualization, negative beliefs about paranoia were associated with distress due to 
delusional ideation on the PSYRATS. Our hypotheses that survival (positive beliefs) and 
negative beliefs about paranoia would both predict suspiciousness ratings on the PANSS 
were also supported. Moreover, the co-occurrence of survival and negative beliefs was 
found to be associated with higher PANSS suspiciousness ratings, which is consistent with a 
metacognitive model of paranoia (Morrison et al., 2011). 
4.2 Findings in relation to previous studies 
The three subscales of the BaPS replicates two previous studies of the 18-item version of 
the measure (Gumley et al., 2011; Morrison et al., 2011) which suggests reliability of its 
factor structure. The finding that both survival beliefs and negative beliefs about paranoia 
were predictive of the severity of suspiciousness, as measured by the PANSS, provides 
additional support for the metacognitive model of paranoia (Morrison et al., 2011), and 
therefore highlights that the severity of paranoia is not just due to the content of paranoid 
thoughts per se. The metacognitive model of paranoia outlines how positive metabeliefs 
(e.g. viewing paranoia as a survival strategy) represent motivation to engage with paranoia 
as a cognitive attentional response for coping with perceived interpersonal threat. Negative 
metabeliefs (e.g. perceiving paranoia as uncontrollable or harmful), results in clinically 
distressing paranoia. The findings are consistent with previous tests of the measure in a 
smaller clinical sample (Morrison et al., 2011) and non-patient groups (Gumley et al., 2011; 
Morrison et al., 2005). The findings also add to a growing body of evidence for the role of 
metacognition in paranoia (Freeman and Garety, 1999; Laroi and Van der Linden, 2005; 
Morrison and Wells, 2003; Varese et al., 2011). 
 
A novel finding of the present study was our support for the hypothesis that the co-
occurrence of positive and negative beliefs about paranoia would be associated with more 
severe suspiciousness on the PANSS. The interaction of these metabeliefs independently 
predicted the severity of suspiciousness, above the individual contribution of survival and 
negative beliefs. We observed that survival beliefs only predicted suspiciousness when 
negative beliefs were simultaneously high. This suggests that positive beliefs about paranoia 
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as a survival strategy are normal to a degree and not clinically problematic per se, perhaps 
representing paranoia as an evolved or learnt response for coping with threat. Consistent 
with a metacognitive model, it appears that only when the paranoia is concurrently appraised 
as uncontrollable, distressing or as interfering with other aspects of the person’s life, that it 
reaches higher levels of clinical severity. Negative beliefs about paranoia retained a main 
effect as an independent predictor of suspiciousness. This is expected given that negative 
metabeliefs are thought to define the transition from non-problematic to more severe clinical 
paranoia (Morrison et al., 2011). As in the model of GAD (Wells, 1995), this transition may 
initially arise from repeated use of paranoia as a survival strategy, following which increasing 
automatization of paranoid ideation may lead to the experience of uncontrollability and 
increased disruption. The effect was amplified when negative beliefs co-occurred with high 
endorsement of survival beliefs. The co-occurrence of positive and negative metabeliefs is 
said to have a causal role in clinical distress due to contributing to a self-regulatory conflict 
(Wells, 1995). In the metacognitive model of paranoia (Morrison et al., 2011) this includes 
conflicting motives to engage with paranoid thinking and threat monitoring, versus motives to 
avoid or suppress paranoia. The latter promotes cognitive and behavioural control attempts 
(such as social avoidance, thought suppression and substance misuse) which may lead to 
vicious maintenance cycles which further increase the experience of uncontrollability, 
disruption and consequent distress.  
 
This was the first study to show that the interaction of positive and negative metabeliefs was 
associated with increased paranoia. Whereas previous studies of metacognition in paranoia 
have mainly used general measures of metacognition, the development of the BaPS 
measure enabled the examination of specific hypotheses of the metacognitive model of 
paranoia. A previous BaPS study (Morrison et al., 2011) also examined this interaction 
hypothesis as a predictor of patient status but did not find a significant effect. However, the 
outcome of diagnosis of a psychotic disorder versus non-patients may have been too 
general as opposed to the specific prediction of persecutory delusions. The results of the 
present study are more likely to be reliable, since the measurement of paranoia is more 
comprehensive (using PANSS for the whole sample), and the sample size is considerably 
larger. 
 
Although normalizing beliefs are not included in a metacognitive conceptualisation of 
paranoia, they were included in the measure because they could be viewed as beliefs that 
should increase as a result of normalizing interventions in cognitive therapy. Normalizing 
beliefs were not associated with severity of suspiciousness or dimensions of delusional 
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beliefs in our large clinical sample. The lack of association between normalizing beliefs and 
paranoia is consistent with the previous studies of the BaPS (Morrison et al., 2005; Gumley 
et al., 2011; Morrison et al., 2011), as well a recent study normalizing beliefs and psychotic 
experiences in a large non-clinical sample (Schlier et al., 2016). This suggests that 
normalizing interventions would not result in an increase in symptoms (Schlier et al., 2016), 
and they may be functional in terms of and increasing willingness to engage with cognitive 
interventions and reducing feelings of shame and hopelessness (Morrison et al., 2016). 
Further research is required to assess the sensitivity of the BaPS subscales to therapeutic 
change.  
 
4.3 Limitations 
A strength of the study is the large clinical sample; however, a number of limitations require 
consideration. The sample was a self-selected sample of people who had consented to 
participate in a clinical trial, which may influence the generalisability of the results.  
The cross-sectional design prevents inferences of causality with respect to testing the 
model. The metacognitive model outlines how positive and negative metabeliefs contribute 
to the initial development of paranoia, but they could also develop as consequence of 
paranoia. For example, positive beliefs could reflect a view of paranoia as necessary given 
the seriousness of the perceived threat, and negative metabeliefs can also result from the 
distress and disruption caused by paranoia. Longitudinal or experimental designs are, 
therefore, required to delineate the precise direction of effects. However, the metacognitive 
model does account for bi-directional effects in that additional negative beliefs and 
catastrophization about paranoia are said to result from appraisal of its distressing 
consequences, which motivate further unhelpful responses and perpetuate paranoia 
(Morrison et al., 2011). Therefore, even if such metabeliefs primarily arise as a result of 
paranoia, they may still have a role in its maintenance and be a potential target for 
intervention.  
 
The large sample size meant that some small correlations between the BaPS with PANSS 
and PSYRATS items reached statistical significance, and should therefore be interpreted 
cautiously. Medium-sized correlations were observed between negative metabeliefs and 
anxiety, suspiciousness, and distress due to delusional ideation as expected, given that 
negative metabeliefs are hypothesised to contribute to clinically distressing paranoia 
(Morrison et al., 2005). The survival beliefs subscale had a smaller correlation with PANSS 
suspiciousness. Larger correlations may have been observed had we examined separate, 
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specific outcomes of paranoia frequency and paranoia distress, but the theorised 
relationships between positive metabeliefs and paranoia frequency and negative metabeliefs 
and distress have been previously shown in non-clinical samples (Gumley et al., 2011; 
Morrison et al., 2011); and the expected relationship between negative beliefs and 
delusional distress was also shown in the present clinical sample. The main PANSS 
suspiciousness/ persecution item is rated according to symptom severity and disruption, and 
was included as a measure of clinical paranoia which combined aspects of frequency and 
distress. All staff received training and supervision regarding use of the PANSS. 
 
4.4 Clinical implications 
When working with people experiencing distressing paranoia it may be important to assess 
for positive and negative metabeliefs; for example, by exploring the perceived advantages 
and disadvantages of paranoia, including the experience of uncontrollability. This could be 
done verbally or using our questionnaire. It appears unlikely that people would be motivated 
to reduce their paranoia if they viewed it as necessary for survival or as their main means of 
coping. High endorsement of positive beliefs about paranoia may also contribute to overuse 
of paranoia as a strategy and development of uncontrollability beliefs and distress.  It may 
therefore be important to help the person find other ways to increase their sense of personal 
safety, assess other means of coping available to the individual, or replace other positive 
functions before commencing work to reduce paranoia. As described by Morrison and 
colleagues (2011), a shared view should also be formed about the accuracy of their 
paranoia, particularly as many patients have had life experiences that promote a paranoid 
world-view (Bentall and Fernyhough, 2008; Varese et al., 2012) and positive beliefs about 
the necessity of paranoia. Acknowledging this historically, perhaps by developing a 
longitudinal formulation (e.g. Morrison, 2001), may benefit engagement whilst also 
highlighting the importance of examining the accuracy of their paranoia in relation to current 
context. If the person holds catastrophic beliefs about paranoia, which are contributing to 
distress, these could be examined using cognitive techniques and behavioural experiments 
similar to strategies outlined to modify negative beliefs about worry (Wells, 1997). The 
provision of normalizing information, such as the common frequency of paranoid thoughts 
(Freeman et al., 2005) and information about famous people who are known to experience 
paranoia, may help to promote more accepting appraisals of paranoia. As well as reducing 
distress due to stigma and shame, the acceptance of symptoms may also lessen the need to 
either engage with or control the experience (Brett et al., 2014). 
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As an alternative to working with the content of paranoid thoughts, there may also be utility 
in intervening in the process of paranoia as a motivated response to the initial perception of 
threat, using metacognitive therapy (e.g. Wells, 2008). This may be useful when the person 
finds the uncontrollability of paranoia as more problematic than the conviction in their 
thoughts. This could involve a focus on reducing preservative processing (worry and 
rumination), threat monitoring and self-focused attention, as well as replacing unhelpful 
behavioural or thought control strategies with more adaptive ways of responding to thoughts.  
Specific strategies include detached mindfulness, attention training and worry/ rumination 
postponement (Wells, 2008). An exploratory trial using metacognitive therapy for psychosis 
found evidence of acceptability and clinically significant symptom change (Morrison et al., 
2014a). Furthermore, a recent randomised controlled trial of a brief intervention targeted at 
worry rather than the content of paranoid thoughts, resulted in significant reductions to long-
standing paranoid delusions in a large sample (Freeman et al., 2015). However, further trials 
of metacognitive therapy for psychosis are required before firm recommendations can be 
made.  
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Figure 1 – Path diagram for the confirmatory factor analysis showing standardized 
regression weights for the BaPS items onto the subscales, correlations between the 
subscales, and the correlated error terms 
 
Note: The item numbers for each subscale correspond to each questionnaire item as follows: 
Negative beliefs - BAPS1) My paranoia gets out of control; BAPS2) I get upset when I feel paranoid; 
BAPS7) My paranoia prevents me from doing things I enjoy; BAPS9) My paranoid thoughts worry me; 
BAPS14) My paranoia gets exaggerated, BAPS18) My paranoia distresses me. Survival beliefs - 
BAPS3) It is important to be paranoid; BAPS4) If I were not paranoid others would take advantage of 
me; BAPS5) It is safer to be paranoid; BAPS11) My paranoia keeps me on my toes; BAPS12) Being 
paranoid keeps me sharp; BAPS15) My paranoia protects me. Normalizing beliefs - BAPS6) 
Everybody feels paranoid at some time or other; BAPS8) Most people get paranoid sometimes; 
BAPS10) Paranoia is normal; BAPS13) Everybody is paranoid on some level; BaPS 16) Paranoia is 
something everybody has to some extent; BAPS17) Being paranoid is just human nature. 
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Table 1. Correlations between the BaPS and items from the PANSS and PSYRATS 
 
 
 
PANSS Item 
 
PSYRATS Item 
  
Delusions 
Suspiciousness 
/ persecution 
Anxiety 
Social 
avoidance 
 
Amount of 
preoccupation 
Duration of 
preoccupation 
Conviction 
Amount of 
distress 
Intensity of 
distress 
Disruption 
Subscale 
total 
             
Total BAPS 
score 
0.150 0.279* 0.309* 0.199*  0.093 0.159 0.109 0.273* 0.271* 0.087 0.237* 
             
Survival 
strategy 
0.157 0.220* 0.177 0.188  0.113 0.127 0.134 0.149 0.187* 0.143 0.166 
             
Negative 
beliefs 
0.085 0.319* 0.424* 0.306*  0.081 0.180 0.058 0.380* 0.332* 0.083 0.280* 
             
Normalizing 
beliefs 
0.093 0.066 0.059 -0.071  0.012 0.041 0.053 0.052 0.067 -0.033 0.065 
                  
* Significant at p < 0.001. A conservative p value was chosen to correct for multiple comparisons in this table (0.05 / 44 = 0.001). 
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Table 2.  Mean BaPS scores among lower versus higher scorers on the PANSS 
suspiciousness/ persecution item 
  
PANSS 
suspiciousness < 5 
PANSS 
suspiciousness 5 + 
p-value 
  Mean (SD) Mean (SD)   
 
Total BaPS score 37.64 (9.99) 41.79 (11.12) <0.001 
    
Survival strategy 9.43 (3.63) 11.14 (5.17) 0.001 
    
Negative beliefs 14.66 (5.25) 17.19 (5.06) <0.001 
    
Normalizing beliefs 13.54 (4.73) 13.46 (4.80) 0.877 
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Table 3. BaPS subscales as predictors of PANSS suspiciousness/ persecution  
 
 
Variable 
 
Odds Ratio 95% CI  p-value 
 
Survival beliefs 
 
1.07 
 
 
1.02, 1.12 
 
 
0.007 
 
Negative beliefs 1.10 1.06, 1.15 <0.001 
Normalizing beliefs 0.97 0.93, 1.02 0.225 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Interaction between survival1 and negative beliefs1 on PANSS suspiciousness/ 
persecution  
 
 
Variable 
 
Odds Ratio 95% CI  p-value 
 
Survival beliefs 
 
 
1.20 
 
 
0.96, 1.49 
 
. 
0.107 
 
Negative beliefs 1.75 1.41, 2.19 <0.001 
Survival by negative beliefs 1.27 1.04, 1.56 0.021 
 
1. The subscale scores were standardized (z-scores) prior to the creation of the product 
term for the interaction.
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Figure 2. Scatterplot of BaPS survival beliefs versus PANSS suspiciousness, grouped by 
BaPS negative beliefs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
